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COUNSEL-WAIVER*-The

sixth amendment to the United States Constitution entitles one
charged with a crime to the assistance of counsel as an essential
jurisdictional prerequisite to the court's authority to deprive the
accused of his life or liberty.' Lack of counsel will not bar conviction
if the accused competently and intelligently 2 waives his right to be
represented.3 The United States Supreme Court has said that
"'courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver'""
and " 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights."' 5 For example, even a plea of guilty will not automatically
waive the right to counsel." To further protect the rights of the indigent accused, the high Court has said that the record or at least
an allegation and evidence must show that the accused was offered
7
counsel and intelligently waived his right.
In State v. Vaughn, 8 the defendants were charged with a noncapi* State v. Vaughn, 393 P.2d 711 (N.M. 1964) ; Sanders v. Cox, 395 P.2d 353 (N.M.
1964).
1. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (life) ; Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963) (liberty). The sixth amendment was originally enforced only against the
federal government, United States v. Dawson, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 467, 487 (1853), but
in Gideon the Supreme Court held that right to counsel was fundamental and essential
to a fair trial and "made obligatory upon the states by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Gideon v. Wainwright, supra at 342. For the pre-Gideon history of the development of
right to counsel, from a right to bring a lawyer to court to the right of an indigent to
have counsel appointed, see Beaney, Right to Counsel in American Courts (1955).
2. What constitutes competence and intelligence in waiving the right to counsel will
not be covered by this comment. See Annot., 71 A.L.R.2d 1160 (1960). The subject of the
annotation mainly concerns waiver by minors, but the elements discussed could apply
generally.
3. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938). Johnson is a federal case but is no
longer distinguishable in state prosecutions on that ground:
We have held that the guarantees of the First Amendment . . . the prohibition
of unreasonable searches and seizures of the Fourth Amendment . . . and the
right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, Gideon v. Wainwright
• . . are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth Amendment
according to the same standards that protect those personal rights against
federal encroachment.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964).
4. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
5. Ibid.
6. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 788 (1945).
7.
Presuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible. The record must show,
or there must be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was
offered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the offer. Anything
less is not a waiver.
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962).
8. 393 P.2d 711 (N.M. 1964).
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tal felony 9 when brought before the Justice of the Peace, and they
entered a plea of not guilty. 1° At the preliminary hearing" they
3
asked for counsel' 2 and were told they would have to hire a lawyer.'
Unable to do so, they represented themselves.' 4
When bound over to district court they were appointed counsel.'"
After a verdict of guilty was returned, the defendants moved for
a new trial 6 on the grounds that they were denied their constitutional right to counsel at the preliminary hearing. The motion was
denied. On appeal to the New Mexico Supreme Court, held, Affirmed. 7 There is a constitutional right to appointed counsel at the
preliminary hearing,'" but if counsel is appointed at a later stage and
counsel and accused are then questioned about the denial of the right
to appointed counsel at the preliminary hearing, a failure to object
to the denial amounts to an express waiver of the right. 9
9. The defendants were charged with escaping from the New Mexico State Penitentiary, a crime punishable by a sentence of two years to life. N.M. Laws 1955, ch. 143, § 1,
now covered by N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 40A-22-9, -29-3 (B) (Repl. 1964).
10. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-1 (Repl. 1964) provides:
When the defendant is brought before the magistrate upon arrest . . . the
magistrate must immediately inform him of the charge against him, and of his
right to the aid of counsel in every stage of the proceedings, and also his right
to waive an examination [preliminary hearing] before any further proceedings
are had.
This proceeding is commonly called the magistrate's arraignment because the accused is
usually required to plead. There is apparently no statutory authority for the plea.
11. N.M. Stat. Ann. §41-3-8 (Repl. 1964). The popular name is preliminary hearing,
but the statutory language is preliminary examination. Article 3 of Chapter 41, N.M. Stat.
Ann. (Repl. 1964), apparently encompasses both proceedings herein referred to as the
magistrate's arraignment and the preliminary hearing. The compilers of the statutes
have captioned Article 3 as "Preliminary Examination." See N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-3-1
to -16 (Repl. 1964).
12. Record, pp. 19-20, State v. Vaughn, 393 P.2d 711 (N.M. 1964).
13. The statute provides that the accused is to be told that he has a right to be represented by counsel at every stage, but the magistrate is not authorized to appoint counsel
for indigents. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-1 (Repl. 1964). But see the discussion of District
Court Rule 92 at note 54 infra and accompanying text.
14. One of the defendants asked when counsel would be appointed; he was told that
counsel would be appointed only at the district court. He chose to waive the preliminary
hearing. The other two defendants went through the motions of presenting a defense,
cross-examining witnesses, etc.
15. New Mexico has appointed counsel for indigents in all felony cases at the district
court stage since 1937. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-11-2 (Repl. 1964). The defendants asked
the court to appoint a second attorney after becoming dissatisfied with the first appointee.
The court refused, so the defendants said they would conduct the trial themselves. The
attorney attended the trial and attempted to help the defendants. Record, p. 40, State v.
Vaughn, 393 P.2d 711 (N.M. 1964).
16. A new attorney was appointed for the motion for new trial. He and another member of the same firm took the case on appeal.
17. State v. Vaughn, 393 P.2d 711, 716 (N.M. 1964).
18. Id. at 713.
19. Id. at 715.
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In Sanders v. Cox,2" the petitioner was charged with three separate noncapital felonies. At the magistrate's arraignment the petitioner entered a plea of guilty to each charge but the prosecution
elected to hold a preliminary hearing." The petitioner was not
represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing but was later appointed counsel at the district court. He was eventually sentenced
to the penitentiary on the basis of his plea of guilty. He petitioned
the New Mexico Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus on
grounds that he had been denied the right to counsel at the preliminary hearing and also before that hearing, i.e., at the magistrate's arraignment." The New Mexico Supreme Court, held, Writ
of habeas corpus denied." There is no absolute constitutional right
to counsel prior to the preliminary hearing in a noncapital case 24
and the right to counsel at the preliminary hearing is waived if the
counsel appointed at a later stage does not show the trial court that
some prejudice resulted.2 5
To find that the defendants in Vaughn had waived their right to
counsel at the preliminary hearing, the court used the following
reasoning: (1) There is a right to be represented by counsel at the
preliminary hearing, 26 which may be waived;2 7 (2) in New Mexico
20. 395 P.2d 353 (N.M. 1964).
21. The facts were taken from the reported opinion.
22. See note 10 supra.
23. Sanders v. Cox, 395 P.2d 353, 354 (N.M. 1964).
24. A discussion of what should be the earliest critical stage in a noncapital case is
beyond the scope of this comment. The United States Supreme Court has not ruled directly
on the point, but it should be noted that Mr. Justice Clark, concurring in Gideon, said
that the Court had now done away with the distinction between capital and noncapital
felonies on the right to counsel issue. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 347-48 (1963)
(concurring opinion).
25. Sanders v. Cox, 395 P.2d 353, 354 (N.M. 1964).
26. The court said that there was a right to counsel at every critical stage and that
"the preliminary examination may be such a critical stage," State v. Vaughn, 393 P.2d
711, 713 (N.M. 1964), and also said that "it may be assumed that [defendants] . . .
knew of their constitutional right to have had the assistance of counsel at their preliminary
examination . . . ." Id. at 715. For this holding in a noncapital case the court relied on
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963), a capital case, indicating that possibly it was
taking Mr. Justice Clark's advice that the distinction between capital and noncapital
felonies had been abolished. See note 24 supra. In White, the Supreme Court said that
what made the Maryland proceeding critical was the plea entered before the magistrate.
White v. Maryland, supra at 60. In New Mexico, normally two pleas are taken before
the accused has the actual preliminary hearing; first, at the so-called magistrate's arraignment, and again just prior to the hearing. The court in Faughn did not emphasize
this point although the defendants had given pleas both times. Record, pp. 18-19, State
v. Vaughn, 393 P.2d 711 (N.M. 1964). The statutes apparently do not provide for a plea
at this stage. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 41-3-1 to -16 (Repl. 1964). But see Poldervaart, New
Mexico Justice Manual 163 (1958).
27. State v. Vaughn, 393 P.2d 711, 714 (N.M. 1964), citing Moore v. Michigan, 355
U.S. 155 (1957).
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a criminal defendant may make a plea in abatement prior to district
court arraignment and have the case remanded to the committing
magistrate to correct constitutional errors made at the preliminary
hearing; 28 (3) at a pre-trial conference the trial judge asked the
defendants and their appointed counsel if they had any objections
to the proceedings before the magistrate and all said no; 20 (4) since
the defendants did not ask to remand, they in effect waived any objection to the denial of their right to counsel at the preliminary hearing. °
In Carnley v. Cochran,31 the United States Supreme Court reversed a conviction and remanded to the state court because "the
record [did] not show that the trial judge offered and the petitioner
declined counsel. ' 32 In Vaughn, the record did not show that the
trial judge at the pre-trial conference "offered" the defendants the
information that they had been denied the right to counsel at the
preliminary hearing and could remand for another hearing with
counsel. This so-called pre-trial conference is not a creature of the
New Mexico statutes on criminal procedure and there was no transcript of the proceedings. However, the New Mexico Supreme
Court found that the conference of April 3, 1963 concerned "the
33
denial of counsel to [defendants] at the preliminary."
The trial judge in Vaughn did keep his handwritten notes of the
pre-trial conference but in his order denying the new trial he was
careful to say only that he asked each defendant and their appointed
attorney "whether they had any objections to the proceedings at
and during the Preliminary Hearing. ' 34 This was the only statement of record and certainly does not indicate that the conference
concerned denial of right to counsel. Furthermore, a negative reply
to such a general question would not seem to indicate a waiver of a
28. State v. Vaughn, 393 P.2d 711, 714 (N.M. 1964), citing State ex rel. Hanagan v.
Armijo, 72 N.M. 50, 380 P.2d 196 (1963) and State v. Rogers, 31 N.M. 485, 247 Pac. 828
(1926).
29. Record, p. 39, State v. Vaughn, 393 P.2d 711 (N.M. 1964).
30. "An intelligent waiver of the right to remand just as effectively waives the
right to the preliminary as does waiver before the magistrate." State v. Vaughn, 393
P.2d 711, 714 (N.M. 1964).
31. 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
32. Id. at 513.
33. State v. Vaughn, 393 P.2d 711, 715 (N.M. 1964).
34. Id. at 713.
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constitutional right under the cases decided by the United States
Supreme Court. "%

But Carnley v. Cochran also states that if the waiver was not
made for the record "there must be an allegation and evidence
which show, that an accused was offered counsel but ... rejected the
offer. Anything less is not a waiver."3' 6 Even with this test the court
in Vaughn had a problem since the allegation and evidence of waiver

were not shown by testimony in the record on appeal. The court
could have believed that the lack of objection to the trial judge's
very general question about the preliminary hearing was enough to

constitute a waiver of a constitutional right, but this would clearly
be erroneous under the United States Supreme Court precedents.3
It is possible that the attorneys and the court discussed the matter

on oral argument and it was shown exactly what was discussed at
the pre-trial conference. That might have resolved the issue for the

appellate court, but it is doubtful that such a presentation is what
the United States Supreme Court meant by allegation and evidence.

Perhaps sensing the weakness of the finding, without facts in the
record, that the defendants were actually told of their right to

counsel and had then made an affirmative waiver, the court in
Vaughn justified the finding with the following presumption:
In view of the fact that defendants had the assistance of counsel at
the first hearing before the trial judge on April 3, 196338

. . . it
may be assumed that they not only knew of their constitutional right

35. Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 161-62 (1957), Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S.
458 (1938), and Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962), all indicate that the accused must be asked if he desires counsel and he can then decline the offer. If he does
decline, waiving his right, he would later have the burden of showing that the waiver
was not intelligent and competent.
One case goes even further and states that if the accused waives the right to counsel the judge must make more than a routine inquiry and assure himself that the waiver
was valid. The opinion of the court was "signed" by its author and three others. The
latter fact plus the odd circumstances of this wartime civil liberties case may make it an
isolated opinion. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948) (opinion of Black, J.).
Two pre-Gideon 5-4 decisions support the opposing view: Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S.
640 (1948), and Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946). Under these holdings the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment did not require the record to show that the
state court inquired about defendant's desire to be represented.
36. Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962). See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
37. See note 35 supra.
38. The "hearing" referred to by the court was the pre-trial conference.
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to have had the assistance of counsel at their preliminary examination,
but had been advised as well concerning their right to have the information abated and the case remanded . . .

No direct authority exists for this presumption, which seems to
propose that constitutional rights may be waived by acquiescence
to the later appointment of counsel.40 In Vaughn, where the defendants clearly expressed their desire for assistance of counsel at
the preliminary hearing and later asked that their trial counsel be
replaced, the presumption is certainly strained. 4'
What does Sanders v. Cox, coming less than two months after
Vaughn, do to the holding in Vaughn? Sanders says that there are
no cases supporting the contention that a person accused of a noncapital felony has a right to counsel prior to the preliminary hearing.42 In Vaughn the court held that a person accused of a noncapital
felony had a right to counsel at the preliminary hearing, citing no
cases to support the contention. 3 On this point, then, it is arguable
that Sanders weakens Vaughn by making the capital-noncapital
distinction.
It is obvious that the court in Sanders did extend the capitalnoncapital distinction to the preliminary hearing as well as proceedings prior to the hearing and hence apparently overruled
Vaughn. The court did not say this, of course, but it did say that
now the defendant has to show that prejudice resulted at the hearing to prevail on a claim of denial of right to counsel at the preliminary hearing. This was the test for the right to counsel at the
39. State v. Vaughn, 393 P.2d 711, 715 (N.M. 1964).
40. The court in Vaughn relied on State. v. Garcia, 47 N.M. 319, 142 P.2d 552 (1943),
and Orr v. State, 200 Ind. 27, 161 N.E. 269 (1928), for this point. In Garcia the defendant had the advice of counsel when brought before the judge for arraignment, but
later fired his lawyer and voluntarily changed his plea to guilty. Garcia relied entirely
on Orr. In Orr, the accused pleaded not guilty, later changed the plea to guilty and was
convicted. His attorney moved for a new trial, but the trial judge denied the motion
after a review of all the evidence. The Indiana Supreme Court also reviewed the evidence and held that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in denying the new trial.
By way of dictum it noted that apparently the accused had able counsel and was fully
advised of his rights and defenses. Orr v. State, supra at 29, 161 N.E. at 270.
41. The only advice the defendants had which was on the record was the district
attorney's statement that they could not have an attorney appointed at the preliminary
hearing. Record, pp. 19-20, State v. Vaughn, 393 P.2d 711 (N.M. 1964). It does not
reasonably follow, after requesting counsel at the preliminary hearing, that if and when
the defendants were told that the district attorney was wrong, they would docilely waive
all objections.
42. Sanders v. Cox, 395 P.2d 353 (N.M. 1964).
43. State v. Vaughn, 393 P.2d 711, 713, 715 (N.M. 1964).
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trial level in state courts before Gideon v. Wainwright; i.e., only
those charged with a capital crime had an absolute right to counsel,
and others had to show after conviction that they had been prejudiced by the denial due to special circumstances. 44 Limiting Gideon
to its facts, the New Mexico court probably reasoned that it could
still use the prejudice test for pre-trial proceedings.4" In Vaughn,
the court did not discuss whether any prejudice had resulted4" because it did not make the capital-noncapital distinction. The court
simply said that the defendants had a right to counsel at the preliminary hearing, and those defendants had been charged with a
noncapital crime.
Under the pre-Gideon rule the defendant could raise the issue of
denial of right to counsel resulting in prejudice on appeal and on
petition for habeas corpus. The court, even the United States Supreme Court, would then examine the facts and decide whether
prejudice had in fact resulted. 7 But in Sanders the New Mexico
court refused to make an independent ruling on whether prejudice
resulted." The court instead said that since the petitioner's trial
attorney saw the transcript of the preliminary hearing, the attorney
had to raise any question of prejudice before the trial judge or the
issue of denial of right to counsel at the hearing was waived. "A
defendant in a criminal case may not acquiesce in any error and
44. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
45. See note 25 supra and accompanying text. But see the recent opinion of the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals:
Before Gideon, it may have been possible to argue that the more egregious
cases of prejudice could be rectified if pleas of guilty were reviewed for 'fundamental fairness.' But it was precisely this sort of elusive and unsatisfactory inquiry into the possibility of prejudice which Gideon sought to inter once and
for all. Indeed, the overruling of Betts by Gideon seems grounded on two fundamental assumptions: that a criminal defendant compelled to act without the
advice of counsel will always be disadvantaged thereby, and that the precise
degree of that disadvantage can never be satisfactorily measured by an afterthe-fact search for prejudice. Since the considerations which impelled the Gideon
Court to abandon the 'fundamental fairness' test seem equally applicable to
guilty pleas, there would seem no warrant for resurrecting a rule of law which
has been so thoroughly discredited.
United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303, 308-09 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 998 (1964).
46. The evidence was uncontradicted that the defendants in Vaughn had escaped
from the penitentiary. Since the purpose of the preliminary hearing is only to find
probable cause, it would seem that a defendant might have a heavy burden in showing
prejudice which would demand reversal.
47. See, e.g., Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
48. Sanders v. Cox, 395 P.2d 353, 354 (N.M. 1964).
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later assign such error for his discharge from custody. ' 49 If the
court meant that the defendant had acquiesced in the denial of right
to counsel by not raising the issue at the trial level, the court would
clearly be overlooking the admonition of the United States Supreme
Court that "we 'do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights.' A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege." 50 In other words,
the defendant in Sanders could not waive this right by mere acquiescence in his attorney's lack of objection. He did not know of any
right or privilege at that point; how, therefore, could he have intentionally abandoned any objections he might have had? 5'
It can be argued that Vaughn and Sanders are distinguishable,
and that the latter did not overrule the former. In Sanders, the defendant had pleaded guilty at his preliminary hearing. He had in
effect decided not to challenge the State's assertion that there was
probable cause. Indeed, the plea of guilty before the magistrate
automatically waives the right to a preliminary hearing,5'2 but the
State chose to have a hearing. In Vaughn, on the other hand, the
defendants pleaded not guilty and therefore put the issue of probable cause squarely before the magistrate at the preliminary hearing. Common sense might dictate that the accused would have more
need for counsel in the Vaughn situation, and the court would not
bother to look for prejudice, but would hold the denial of counsel
unconstitutional.
But saving Vaughn as precedent by this distinction really depends on finding that the court in Sanders is correct in saying that
a plea of guilty makes a difference on the issue of right to counsel.
If the district attorney is not sure of the case he has before him and
requests a preliminary hearing, it can be argued that maybe the
defendant should not have been so sure of his plea, and needs coun49. Ibid.
50. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
51. Since Sanders had appointed counsel at the district court stage, why didn't the
supreme court use the Vaughn argument of a presumption that he was told of his right
to counsel and the right to remand by the attorney? (See note 40 supra and accompanying text.) This point is interesting only because one might think initially that the court
in Sanders could have found a waiver without devising the prejudice test. But during
the hearing before the supreme court on Sanders' petition, the attorney who had been
appointed for the original trial testified that he had not considered telling the defendant
of any possible denial of a constitutional right at the preliminary hearing. [This testimony
is on tape which is not a part of the permanent record of the case. The author of this
comment attended the hearing.]
52. State v. Alaniz, 55 N.M. 312, 316-17, 232 P.2d 982, 984 (1951).
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sel at the preliminary hearing as much as anyone. Furthermore,
the United States Supreme Court has ruled that "a defendant who
pleads guilty is entitled to the benefit of counsel, and a request for
counsel is not necessary." 5 3 It would seem that if the State decided
to have a preliminary hearing, and if there really is a right to counsel at the preliminary hearing for a noncapital felon, then the fact
that the accused pleads guilty before the hearing cannot affect his
right to have the assistance of counsel. Assuming no waiver, Vaughn
should control and the petitioner in Sanders would be granted a
writ of habeas corpus on the basis of the denial of right to counsel
at the preliminary hearing. The alternative would be to fall back
on the capital-noncapital distinction, overrule Vaughn, and demand
that prejudice be shown regardless of the plea.
It must be noted that the court only has to wrestle with these
problems for prosecutions which began before September 1, 1964,
the effective date of Rule 92 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for the
New Mexico District Courts. 54 Under Rule 92, the district court
must appoint an attorney to represent an indigent defendant at the
preliminary hearing, when the request of a bona fide indigent is
certified to the court by the committing magistrate. The accused
may waive the right to representation by counsel at the preliminary
53. Rice v. Olson, 324 U.S. 786, 788 (1945).
54. N.M.R. Civ. P. 92:
1. The assistance of counsel is a fundamental right in all criminal proceedings
wherein a defendant is accused of a felony or any crime punishable by a
possible penitentiary sentence. In all such cases, the district court of each judicial
district within the state shall designate by appointment one or more attorneys
to represent any indigent defendant who requests counsel at a preliminary
hearing and all subsequent proceedings in connection with the defendant's defense or appeal if requested.
2. It shall be the duty of the judge of any inferior court, sitting as a committing
magistrate, immediately upon any defendant's being brought before him following his arrest upon a charge constituting a felony, to inform such person of his
right to assistance of counsel at every stage of the proceeding, and that if he is
indigent, that counsel will be appointed to represent him. If after being so informed, unless waived as hereinafter provided and such person is in fact indigent, the judge of such inferior court shall immediately certify such facts in
writing to the district court, requesting the appointment of counsel on behalf of
such defendant by the district judge. Immediately upon receipt of such
certification, it shall be the duty of the district court to appoint counsel to represent the indigent person so charged at the preliminary hearing and in all subsequent proceedings. Nothing herein shall be considered as preventing the intelligent waiver by any defendant of the right to representation by counsel at the
preliminary hearing, but such waiver must be in writing and certified to by the
committing magistrate. (The foregoing Rule 92 to be effective on and after
September 1, 1964.)
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hearing, but the waiver must be in writing and certified to by the
magistrate. But since the real issue for the state courts is the effect
of Gideon v. Wainwright, and since Gideon has been held to apply
retroactively,5" the court is faced with a flood of habeas corpus petitions for pre-Rule 92 denials of counsel.
The New Mexico court may have thought that Gideon would
probably not be limited to its facts for very long.50 Therefore, instead of dismissing all petitions for writ of habeas corpus by per
curiam opinions, when the only issue was denial of counsel before
the trial for one accused of a noncapital crime, the court went ahead
and developed other theories to keep the prison gates from flying
open. As shown by the Vaughn and Sanders cases, the latter approach may give the court more problems than solutions.
MARK

B.

THOMPSON III

55. United States ex rel. Durocher v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 998 (1964).
56. This is a very safe assumption, For example, see the odyssey of Marvin Doughty,
who pleaded guilty without counsel to a noncapital crime and was imprisoned on the
basis of that plea. Doughty petitioned the Supreme Court of Ohio for writ of habeas
corpus and the writ was denied. Doughty v. Sacks, 173 Ohio St. 407, 183 N.E.2d 368
(1962). The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and then remanded for
further consideration in light of Gideon v. Wainwright. Doughty v. Maxwell, 372 U.S.
781 (1963). The Ohio court on remand distinguished Gideon on the grounds that Gideon
had specifically asked for assistance, pleaded not guilty, and had to conduct his defense
on his own, whereas Doughty never requested counsel and pleaded guilty. Doughty v.
Sacks, 175 Ohio St. 46, 191 N.E.2d 727 (1963). Up again on certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion reversed, without remanding, citing Gideon V.
Wainwvright. Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964).

